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1.  Introduction 
Bundling of different insurances is typically observed across insurance markets.  Bundling 
can take two different forms.  In the first form, a single insurance contract covers many 
different types of risk and each risk cannot be insured against in a separate contract.  For 
example, many health or travel insurances cover a wide variety of accidents that may happen 
and it is not possible to insure oneself against only one of these accidents occurring.   
Typically, one cannot take a travel insurance against the loss of a photo camera only.   
Similarly, most basic health insurance contracts offer coverage against many possible diseases 
and it is impossible to break up such a contract and insure only against, say, heart diseases. 
In the second form, insurance companies offer discounts to consumers who take out 
multiple separately sold insurance.  For example, if a consumer takes a health insurance, a car 
insurance, and a travel insurance from the same insurance company, a certain discount is 
provided.  In this paper, we focus on the welfare consequences of the first more extreme form 
of bundling contracts.  One possible explanation for this type of bundling of contracts to exist 
is related to the multiplication of the transaction costs handling all these different contracts 
separately.  We will provide, however, an alternative explanation by abstracting completely 
away from these costs. 
A bundled insurance contract offers insurance against multiple risks at a certain 
premium, possibly with a deductible, which depends on a risk or combination of risks that has 
actually materialized.  Apart from the obvious fact that the deductibles on individual risks and 
the premium for the bundle may be different from the deductibles and the sum of the 
premiums on individual contracts, two potentially important effects arise from bundling 
different insurance contracts.  First, under a bundled contract, the deductible that applies if 
multiple risks materialize does not need to be equal to the sum of the deductibles that apply 
when the individual risks materialize.  For example, a bundled health insurance contract may 
stipulate that the first visit to a general practitioner (family doctor) and a first visit to a 
physiotherapist are not covered, unless the general practitioner prescribes going to the 
physiotherapist.  Second, with single-risk contracts, consumers have generally more choice as 
they can combine different single-risk insurance contracts and the set of insurance contracts 
offered for each individual risk can potentially be as large as the set of bundled multi-risk 
contracts.  This is because insurance companies may be tempted to offer different single-risk   3
contracts to individuals who differ only with respect to another risk dimension.  As we will 
see, this is especially important when companies assess the profitability of offering non-
equilibrium insurance contracts.  Thus, in insurance markets bundling has important 
implications for the incentive compatibility constraints that are binding in equilibrium. 
There is a large literature on the welfare effects of bundling in ordinary commodity 
markets.  This literature (see, e.g., the seminal paper of Adams and Yellen, 1976) considers 
markets where firms have some form of market power and in fact most literature considers 
whether a monopolist can leverage its market power in one market to gain market power in 
another, related market.  The general consensus seems to be that bundling in situations where 
at least one market is perfectly competitive does not yield any benefits to the seller (at least if 
there are no cost advantages of joint production) as one product is always sold at marginal 
cost (cf., Whinston, 1990). 
In this paper, we study bundling in insurance markets.  To underline the difference with 
ordinary markets we consider perfectly competitive markets and build on the seminal research 
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1977).  Unlike bundling in product markets, bundling in perfectly 
competitive insurance markets is feasible because of the effects bundling may have on the 
incentive compatibility constraints mentioned above.  In fact, we will show that in general, 
bundling always leads to a Pareto-superior allocation compared to the no bundling case.   
Because of the assumption of perfect competition, it is immediate that consumers benefit from 
the bundling of insurance products. 
The model we use is based on the Rothschild and Stiglitz framework.  We consider two 
possible risky events and for each event, consumers can be of two possible types, high-risk 
and low-risk.  This means that in principle there are four different types of individuals in our 
model, a type which has high-risks of both events occurring, a type which has low-risks of 
both events occurring, and two types which are low-risk for one event and are high-risk for 
the other event.  An insurance contract is a tuple consisting of a premium and three 
deductibles (possibly equal to zero): a deductible if only the first event occurs, a deductible if 
only the second event occurs, and a deductible if both events occur.  In this setting, we 
analyze the equilibrium contracts when insurance companies offer bundled contracts and 
when they offer only single-risk contracts. 
We arrive at the following results.  A first result says that individuals that have high risk 
of both events occurring get full insurance in any equilibrium.  This follows from standard 
considerations based on Rothschild and Stiglitz, where the high-risk individual also receives 
full insurance.  Second, if there are just three types of individuals in the population and no   4
individual has a low probability of both events occurring, then equilibria where only single-
risk contracts offered can perform equally well as equilibria where bundled contracts are 
offered.  This result may be of independent interest, but should especially be seen as a 
stepping stone to the last result that says that when all four types are present, equilibria with 
single-risk contracts always perform strictly worse than equilibria with multi-risk contracts. 
As far as we know, only one other paper has investigated the issue of bundling in 
insurance markets under adverse selection,
1 namely Fluet and Pannequin (1997).  They 
consider a world like ours with two possible risky events and two risk types per event, but 
restrict the analysis to the special situation where there are only two types of individuals in the 
population.  Under positive correlation, an individual that is a high-risk type for one event is 
also a high-risk type for the second event, while under negative correlation, an individual that 
is a high-risk type for one event is a low-risk type for the second event.  Their main result 
says that under bundling in the equilibrium under negative correlation, the low-risk type with 
respect to a particular source of risk does not necessarily obtain only partial coverage against 
that particular risk.  Because of the restriction to two types, Fluet and Pannequin (1997) have 
only one relevant incentive compatibility constraint to satisfy.  The main point of the present 
paper is that bundling affects the nature of the incentive compatibility constraints in such a 
way that insurance companies can screen more efficiently and that this results in the existence 
of more efficient equilibria.  This is impossible in the simpler framework of Fluet and 
Pannequin (1997) where only two types exist. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the model and provides 
the equilibrium definitions under both single-risk contracts and bundled multi-risk contracts.  
The equilibrium analysis and welfare comparisons are given in section 3.  Section 4 concludes 
and the Appendix contains two lemmas that are used in the proofs of propositions. 
2.  The Model 
We consider a population of risk averse individuals who possess the same state independent 
strictly concave and increasing utility function  ( ) m u .  Individuals are endowed with some 
income level, which we normalize to 1, and are subject to two uncorrelated risks, or binary 
                                                                          
1 A recent paper by Laux (2004) considers bundling in insurance markets from a moral hazard 
perspective.  This perspective may be more relevant to the multiline insurance contracts one recently 
may find in business-to-business relationships (see, also Shimpi 2001).   5
lotteries,  {} 2 , 1 ≡ ∈R r .  With respect to each risk r we follow Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) 
and assume that individuals come into two types.  An individual of type  { } H L I i r r , ≡ ∈  is 
characterized by a probability of an accident 
r i




r q q , in which case he incurs a 
loss of  () 1 , 0 ∈ r e ,  1 2 1 < + e e . Therefore, with respect to both risks, individuals come into four 
types, which we denote by i: 
{ } HH LH HL LL I i i i , , , 2 1 ≡ ∈ ≡ , 
so that the first symbol  1 i  refers to an individual’s type with respect to risk one, and the 
second symbol  2 i  refers to his type with respect to risk two. 
Depending on which of the two risky events occur one of four states of the world 
materializes, which we denote by s: 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) {} 1 , 1 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 1 , 0 , 0 , 2 1 ≡ ∈ ≡ S s s s . 
Here,  1 = r s  corresponds to a state in which risk r results in an accident, and  0 = r s  
corresponds to a state in which risk r does not result in an accident.  Individuals’ loss in state s 
is denoted by  s e .  Thus, we use subscripts to denote risks and states, and superscripts to 
denote individuals’ types with respect to risks. 
Due to statistical independence, an individual of type  I i∈  ends up in state () 0 , 0  with 
probability  () ( )( )
2 1
2 1 0 , 0 1 1
i i i q q q − − = , in state ( ) 1 , 0  with probability  () ( )
2 1
2 1 1 , 0 1
i i i q q q − = , in state 
() 0 , 1  with probability  () ( )
2 1
2 1 0 , 1 1
i i i q q q − = , and in state ( ) 1 , 1  with probability  ()
2 1
2 1 1 , 1
i i i q q q = .  
Table 1 below presents accidental probabilities for all four types and expenditures in all four 
states of the world. 
State  States’ probabilities for types  Losses 
s  HH
s q  
HL
s q  
LH
s q  
LL
s q   s e  
() 0 , 0   ( )( )
H H q q 2 1 1 1 − −   ( )( )
L H q q 2 1 1 1 − − ( )( )
H L q q 2 1 1 1 − − ( )( )
L L q q 2 1 1 1 − −   0 
() 1 , 0   ( )
H H q q 2 1 1−   ( )
L H q q 2 1 1−   ( )
H L q q 2 1 1−   ( )
L L q q 2 1 1−   2 e  
() 0 , 1   ( )
H H q q 2 1 1−   ( )
L H q q 2 1 1−   ( )
H L q q 2 1 1−   ( )
L L q q 2 1 1−   1 e  
() 1 , 1  
H Hq q 2 1  
L Hq q 2 1  
H Lq q 2 1  
L Lq q 2 1   2 1 e e +  
Table 1.  Accidental probabilities and losses of all types in different states. 
Accidental probabilities 
i
s q  of an individual are exogenously fixed and private information of 
the individual.  We denote the ex-ante shares of individuals’ types in the whole population by 
i α , where  0 >
i α  and  1 = ∑ ∈I i
i α .  It is worth to note that although risks are statistically   6
independent, we do not assume the independence of individuals’ types with respect to two 
risks, i.e., we impose no further restrictions on the values of 
i α . 
The supply side of the market consists of a number of competing risk-neutral and profit-
maximizing insurance companies.  These companies are not able (or, not allowed) to 
discriminate between different types of individuals.  Each insurer offers an insurance contract
2 
() () () ( ) 1 , 1 1 , 0 0 , 1 , , , D D D P ≡ Θ  which consists of a premium  ( ) 1 , 0 ∈ P  that individuals pay upfront, 
and deductibles  s D  such that in case of an accident, i.e., in a state  () 0 , 0 \ S s∈ , an insured 
individual receives his loss net of the deductible  s D  from the insurance company.  Table 2 
summarizes individual i’s wealth and utility levels in all states with and without insurance. 
State  Probability  Wealth with  Utility with 
s 
i
s q   no insurance  insurance  no insurance  insurance 
() 0 , 0   ()
i q 0 , 0   1  P − 1   ( ) 1 u   () P u − 1  
() 1 , 0   ()
i q 1 , 0   2 1 e −   () 1 , 0 1 D P − −   ( ) 2 1 e u −   () ( ) 1 , 0 1 D P u − −  
() 0 , 1   ()
i q 0 , 1   1 1 e −   () 0 , 1 1 D P − −   ( ) 1 1 e u −   () ( ) 0 , 1 1 D P u − −  
() 1 , 1   ()
i q 1 , 1   2 1 1 e e − −   () 1 , 1 1 D P − −   ( ) 2 1 1 e e u − −   () ( ) 1 , 1 1 D P u − −  
Table 2.  Accidental probabilities, wealth and utility of type i individual in different states. 
Depending on the contexts, we either restrict insurance companies to sell insurance contracts 
against each risk separately and independently, or allow them to offer multiple-risk insurance 
contracts.  In the latter case, the (multi-risk) contract takes its general form: 
() () () ( ) 1 , 1 1 , 0 0 , 1 , , , D D D P ≡ Θ . 
By  () 2 1 2 1
0 , , , 0 e e e e + ≡ Θ  we denote an artificial contract, which provides no insurance against 
both risks.  In what follows, we implicitly assume that 
0 Θ  is always offered. 
In the former, single-risk case, a contract against risk r will be  () r r r D P , = Θ , where  r P  is 
the price and  r D  is the deductible in case risk r results in a loss.  For comparison reasons, we 
will also refer to a single-risk contract  r Θ  as follows: 
() 2 1 2 1 1 1 , , , e D e D P + ≡ Θ  and  ( ) 2 1 2 1 2 2 , , , D e D e P + ≡ Θ . 
By  2 1,Θ Θ = Θ
S  we denote a collection of two single-risk contracts, which insures an 
individual against both risks: 
                                                                          
2  We do not need to restrict insurance companies to offer only one contract.  As in the classical 
Bertrand (1883) price competition model, two competing multi-contract insurance companies will 
ensure that the considered insurance market is perfectly competitive.   7
() 2 1 2 1 2 1 , , , D D D D P P
S + + ≡ Θ . 
Hence, one important difference between single-risk and multi-risk contracts is that the latter 
do not need to satisfy the additivity constraint  () () () 1 , 1 1 , 0 0 , 1 D D D = + . 
Formally defining  () 0 0 , 0 ≡ D  allows us to write the ex-ante expected utility of an 
individual of type i who buys a (single-risk or multi-risk) contract in the following compact 
form: 





i D P u q U 1 . 
An insurance company that sells a contract Θ to an individual of type i gets an expected 
profit (here after simply denoted by profit) of  





i D e q P π . 
Average per-consumer profit from contract Θ depends on the shares 
i
Θ α  of all four types 
amongst those who buy Θ: 







i i D e q P
,
α π α π . 
Let 
M Σ  be the set of all feasible multi-risk insurance contracts.  The formal definition of 
a multi-risk competitive Nash equilibrium, i.e., the competitive Nash equilibrium when firms 
are allowed to offer multi-risk insurance contracts, is as follows. 
Definition 1.  A multi-risk competitive Nash equilibrium is a subset of insurance contracts 
M M Σ ⊂ Ψ  present in the market satisfying the following conditions: 
a)  Each individual chooses an insurance contract that maximizes his expected utility, i.e., 
each type i chooses a contract  ( ) Θ ∈ Θ
Ψ ∈ Θ
i M i U
M max arg
, , for all  I i∈ . 
b)  Each equilibrium contract offered by insurance companies is bought by at least one 
individual, i.e.,  { } { } U I i
M i M
∈ Θ ∪ Θ = Ψ
, 0 . 
c)  Each equilibrium contract yields nonnegative profit to an insurer, i.e.,  ( ) 0
, ≥ Θ
M i π  for all 
M M Ψ ∈ Θ . 
d)  No insurance company can benefit by unilaterally offering a different insurance contract, 
i.e., if there exists a contract 
M M Ψ Σ ∈ Θ \
*  such that  ( ) ( )
M i i i U U
, * Θ > Θ  for some  I i∈  
then  ( ) 0
* ≤ Θ π .   8
Parts (a), (c) and (d) are part of any standard definition of equilibrium.  In part (a), if an 
individual prefers to remain uninsured, he chooses the contract 
0 Θ  which is a part of any 
equilibrium as stated in part (b).  Part (b) is introduced in order to get rid of a multiplicity of 
uninteresting equilibria, in which some very unfavorable insurance contacts are offered but 
not sold.  We denote individuals’ equilibrium utilities by  ( )
M i i M i U W
, , Θ ≡ . 
In a single-risk environment, Definition 1 has to be modified.  First, individuals must 
choose pairs of single-risk insurance contracts.  Second, an equilibrium must be immunized to 
deviations where a firm deviates in one insurance market only, and to deviations where a firm 
deviates in both insurance markets.  Let 
M S Σ ⊂ Σ  be the set of all feasible single-risk 
insurance contracts.  The formal definition of a single-risk competitive Nash equilibrium, i.e., 
the competitive Nash equilibrium when firms are only allowed to offer single-risk insurance 
contracts, is as follows. 
Definition 2.  A single-risk competitive Nash equilibrium is a subset of single-risk insurance 
contracts 
S S Σ ⊂ Ψ  present in the market satisfying the following conditions: 
a)  Each individual chooses a pair of insurance contracts that maximizes his expected utility, 
i.e., each type i chooses a pair of contracts  ( )
i i i i i S i U
S i i 2 1
,
2 1
, , max arg ,
2 1
Θ Θ ∈ Θ Θ ≡ Θ
Ψ ∈ Θ Θ
, for 
all  I i∈ . 
b)  Each equilibrium contract offered by insurance companies is bought by at least one 







∈ Θ ∪ Θ = Ψ
0 . 
c)  Each equilibrium contract yields nonnegative profit to an insurer, i.e.,  ( ) 0 ≥ Θ
i
r π  for all 
S i
r Ψ ∈ Θ . 
d)  No insurance company can benefit by unilaterally offering a different insurance contract, 
i.e., if there exists a contract 
S S
r Ψ Σ ∈ Θ \
*
*  against risk  R r ∈









~ , Θ > Θ Θ  for some  I i∈  and some contract 
S
r R Ψ ∈ Θ * \
~  against the 
complementary risk 
* \ r R , then it must be that  ( ) 0
*
* ≤ Θ
r π . 
e)  No insurance company can benefit by unilaterally offering a pair of insurance contracts, 
i.e., if there exist two contracts 




1  such that  ( ) ()




1, Θ > Θ Θ  for 




1 ≤ Θ + Θ π π .   9
In equilibrium, an individual of type i chooses a contract 
i
1 Θ  against risk 1 and a contract 
i
2 Θ  
against risk 2.  In part (a) of Definition 2 we allow that, for example, 
HH HL
1 1 Θ ≠ Θ , i.e., that 
different types choose different contracts against risk  1 = r  even if they are of the same type 
1 i  with respect to that risk.  This implies that the set of single-risk equilibrium insurance 
contracts can be larger (up to 8 contracts in total, 4 contracts for each risk) than the set of 
multi-risk equilibrium insurance contracts can be (up to 4 contracts in total).  Thus, 
individuals have potentially more choices in a single-risk equilibrium than in a multi-risk 
equilibrium.  This is the second important difference between multi-risk and single-risk 
insurance contracts. 
We require in part (c) that each single-risk contract makes no losses.  In part (d), we 
explicitly state that if one company deviates from the equilibrium by offering a contract 
*
* r Θ  
against risk 




* r R Θ  against the other risk.  Thus, a single contract 
*
* r Θ  results in 
multiple pairs of contracts from which consumers may choose.  In part (e), we consider multi-
contract deviations, in which a deviating insurance company offers two contracts 
*
1 Θ  and 
*
2 Θ  
simultaneously. 
Standard arguments rule out any pooling contract to be a Nash equilibrium.  For pairs of 
single-risk contracts  () 2 1,Θ Θ = Θ
S , the argument is given by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
3  
For multi-risk contracts, a similar argument generically holds true: for any (partially) pooling 
contract, there exists a contract that marginally differs from it in its price and only one 
deductible in such a way that only the type with the lowest expected loss prefers the latter new 
contract.  This makes the former pooling contract unprofitable and, at the same time, ensures 
that the deviation yields strictly positive profit. 
On the other hand, a separating Nash equilibrium  { }
HH LH HL LL
sep Θ Θ Θ Θ = Ψ , , , , which 
involves four contracts, one for each type, may not exist if there exists a profitable pooling 
contract that provides a higher utility level to either of the types.  In what follows, we always 
assume that the shares of types in the population are such that pooling contracts are always 
inferior to separating contracts, in both single-risk and multi-risk settings.  Due to the same 
reasoning as in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), this will be the case when the share of the most 
risky type in any given pooling contract is sufficiently large (close to one).  If this is the case, 
                                                                          
3 The argument, however, does not forbid equilibria in which, e.g., types  {} HH HL i , ∈  buy the same 
contract 
H
1 Θ .  Thus, the term “pooling” in this context refers to a pair of single-risk contracts.   10
the same inequality as the incentive compatibility constraint will guarantee that the less risky 
types will not be attracted by such a pooling contract.
4  Similar to the multi-risk case, we 
denote individuals’ equilibrium utilities by  ( )
S i i S i U W
, , Θ ≡ . 
3.  Analysis 
We begin the analysis of the model by showing that the type HH in a competitive equilibrium 
gets full insurance against both risks in both single-risk and multi-risk settings. 
Proposition 1.  In a competitive equilibrium, type HH gets full insurance in both single-risk 
and multi-risk settings, i.e.,  ( ) 0 , 0 , 0 ,
, , HH S HH M HH P = Θ = Θ  with 
H H HH q e q e P 2 2 1 1 + = . 
Proof.  The proof follows from the fact that HH is the most risky and, therefore, 
M HH, Θ  must 
provide the highest possible utility.  If it were not the case, offering more insurance at fair 
price to type HH than in contract 
M HH, Θ  would have been a profitable deviation.  Hence, it 
must be that  ( ) Θ = Θ
Σ ∈ Θ
HH M HH U
M max arg
, , subject to the profitability condition 





M HH HH M HH D e q P
, , 0 π π . 
Solving the optimization problem yields that the zero-profit condition binds, i.e., 




s D e q P , and that  ( ) 0 , 0 , 0 ,
, HH M HH P = Θ  where 
H H HH q e q e P 2 2 1 1 + = . 
It is seen that 
M HH, Θ  satisfies the additivity constraint, i.e., it can be written as 




, ,Θ Θ = Θ , where  ( ) ( ) 0 , ,







r q e D P = = Θ .  Therefore, 
M HH, Θ  can be 
implemented as a pair of single-risk contracts, i.e., 




r q e = Θ .  ■ 
In accordance with Proposition 1, the most risky type HH gets full insurance, as in Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976).  This implies that no other contract can provide full insurance at a lower 
price than the contract 
M HH, Θ .  Therefore, any other type of individual will not receive full 
insurance under any circumstance, and will receive at most partial insurance.
5 
                                                                          
4 Formally, we assume that ratios 
LH LL α α / , 
HL LL α α / , 
HH LH α α / , and 
HH HL α α /  are sufficiently small. 
5 Due to the restriction to two types, a type different from type HH might receive full insurance in 
Fluet and Pannequin (1997).  This, however, only happens under what they call negative correlation, 
when the type HH does not exist in the population, violating our assumption that  0 > HH α .   11
In order to find the equilibrium contract 
M i, Θ  for a type  { } LH HL LL i , , ∈ , one must solve 
the following optimization problem: 
() Θ = Θ
Σ ∈ Θ
i M i U
M max arg
, , 
subject to three incentive compatibility constraints 
( ) ( )
M j i M i i U U
, , Θ ≥ Θ ,  i I j \ ∈ , 
and one zero-profit constraint 




s D e q P . 
The solutions to the three optimization problems for all  { } LH HL LL i , , ∈ , together with 
M HH, Θ  is the only candidate for the multi-risk competitive Nash equilibrium.  In order to 
simplify notation, we will refer to the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) 
( ) ( )
M j i M i i U U
, , Θ ≥ Θ  as to either  j i >  or 
j i Θ > .  In order to avoid confusion, we will also 
refer to  j i >  as to  j i
S
>  in single-risk settings, and as to  j i
M
>  in multi-risk settings. 
In equilibrium, depending on the values of parameters different ICC’s will bind.  In order 
to further characterize a separating Nash equilibrium  sep Ψ , and to analyze which ICC’s bind, 
we temporary assume that  0 =
LL α  so that there are no individuals of type LL in the 
population and the contract 
LL Θ  does not need to be offered.  To distinguish the case  0 =
LL α  
from the general case  0 >
LL α , we use underlined notation for the  0 =
LL α  case. 
When  0 =
LL α , a multi-risk competitive Nash equilibrium 
M
sep Ψ  is unique and can easily 
be derived.  The analysis of 
M
sep Ψ  shows that for a large class of utility functions, single-risk 
contracts perform equally well from the social welfare point of view as multi-risk contracts 
do.  Relaxing this temporary assumption allows us to understand better which ICC’s bind, and 
why multi-risk contracts are strictly welfare-superior to single-risk contracts in the presence 
of LL type.  Thus, our assumption  0 =
LL α  also serves didactical purposes. 
Equilibrium without LL-type 
When only types HH, HL, and LH are present in the population, a multi-risk competitive Nash 
equilibrium consists of 3 contracts,  { }
M HH M LH M HL M
sep
, , , , , Θ Θ Θ ≡ Ψ , which satisfy in total six 
incentive compatibility constraints.  In the following proposition, we show that in 
M
sep Ψ , only 
two of them are binding.   12
Proposition 2.  Let  0 =
LL α .  Then, in a multi-risk competitive equilibrium, type HH gets full 
insurance against both risks, i.e., 
M HH M HH , , Θ = Θ .  Types HL and LH get full insurance 
against risks 1 and 2 respectively, i.e., 
( )
HL HL HL M HL D D P , , 0 ,
, = Θ  and  ( )
LH LH LH M LH D D P , 0 , ,
, = Θ . 
ICC’s  LH HL> ,  HL LH > ,  HH HL> , and  HH LH >  do not bind, whereas ICC’s 
LH HH >  and  HL HH >  do bind thereby determining 
LH D  and 
HL D . 
Proof.  First of all, Proposition 1 holds for  0 =
LL α  and, therefore, 
HH HH Θ = Θ . 
Second, we temporarily drop ICC’s  LH HL> ,  HL LH > , and  HH HL> .  Lemma 1 in 
Appendix proves that maximizing  ( )
HL HL U Θ  subject only to ICC  HL HH >  and to the zero-
profit constraint  () ∑ − =
s s s
HL
s D e q P  yields that both constraints bind and determine a corner 
solution in which  () ()
HL HL D D 1 , 1 1 , 0 = ,  () 0 0 , 1 =
HL D , and  () ( )
HL L H HL D e q e q P 1 , 0 2 2 1 1 − + = .  Similarly, 
LH HH >  binds,  () 0 1 , 0 =
LH D ,  () ()
LH LH D D 1 , 1 0 , 1 = , and  () ( ) 2 2 0 , 1 1 1 e q D e q P
H LH L LH + − = . 
Finally, Lemma 2 in Appendix proves that the contracts  () () ( )
HL HL HL HL D D P 1 , 1 1 , 0 , , 0 , = Θ  and 
() () ( )
LH LH LH LH D D P 1 , 1 0 , 1 , 0 , , = Θ  from Lemma 1 satisfy ICC’s  LH HL> ,  HL LH > ,  HH HL> , and 
HH LH >  as strict inequalities.  Hence,  ()
HL HL D D 1 , 0 = ,  ()
LH LH D D 0 , 1 = , 
HL HL P P = , and 
LH LH P P =  define contracts  ( )
HL HL HL M HL D D P , , 0 ,
, = Θ  and  ( )
LH LH LH M LH D D P , 0 , ,
, = Θ  which 
satisfy all necessary equilibrium conditions.  ■ 
This Proposition can easily be interpreted if we note that equilibrium multi-risk contracts 
M HL, Θ  and 
M LH, Θ  can be represented by a pair of single-risk contracts: 
H L M LH
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ  and 
L H M HL
2 1





r Θ Θ ,  is the set of competitive equilibrium contracts against risk r from Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976).  Thus, if type LL is absent in the multi-risk environment, Proposition 2 
basically says that the competitive equilibrium takes the additive form, in which individuals 
get insurance against each risk in accordance with their types with respect to that risk, 
provided this equilibrium exists. 
As all three multi-risk equilibrium contracts can be implemented as pairs of single-risk 
contracts, i.e., 
H H M HH
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ , 
H L M LH
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ , and 
L H M HL
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ , they can be   13
replicated by the following set of single-risk contracts: { }
L H L H
2 2 1 1 , , , Θ Θ Θ Θ .  However, this set 
of single-risk contracts is a single-risk competitive Nash equilibrium only if no type 
{} LH HL LL i , , ∈  prefers the pair of contracts 
L L
2 1,Θ Θ , which we formally denote by 
LL Θ : 
L L LL
2 1 ,Θ Θ ≡ Θ .  In other words, even though type LL is absent in the population, nothing 
prevents individuals in the single-risk environment from buying a pair of contracts 
L
1 Θ  and 
L
2 Θ . 
Formally, for a given utility function, a set of single-risk contracts { }
L H L H
2 2 1 1 , , , Θ Θ Θ Θ  is a 
single-risk competitive equilibrium, i.e.,  { }
L H L H S
sep 2 2 1 1 , , , Θ Θ Θ Θ = Ψ , if and only if three ICC’s 
LL HH Θ > , 
LL HL Θ > , and 
LL LH Θ >  are satisfied.  Otherwise, at least one of the single-risk 
contracts in 
L L
2 1,Θ Θ , or even both, has to be adjusted by increasing the corresponding 
deductible 
HL D  and/or 
LH D .  In the latter case, at least one of the types HL and LH is strictly 
worse-off under single-risk contracts than under multi-risk contracts. 
In the light of the discussion above, we extend the notation and explicitly write the utility 
function as an argument in any notation, e.g.,  ( ) u
S
sep Ψ ,  ( ) u
L
1 Θ ,  () u D
LH   etc.  A natural 
question that arises is whether  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } u u u u u
L H L H S
sep 2 2 1 1 , , , Θ Θ Θ Θ = Ψ  for a given utility 
function u so that single-risk and multi-risk insurance contracts yield the same utility levels, 
or  () () () ( ) ( ) { } u u u u u
L H L H S
sep 2 2 1 1 , , , Θ Θ Θ Θ ≠ Ψ  so that single-risk insurance contracts perform 
strictly worse than multi-risk insurance contracts. 
In Proposition 3 we provide a partial answer to this question.  Let us denote by 
() ( )
L L H L L H D P q e D P q e u m 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 , max 1 + + + + − =  
the lowest wealth that individuals may end up with in a multi-risk equilibrium in the worst 
state of the world, and by 
() ( )
L L L L LL D P D P u m 2 2 1 1 1 + + + − =  
the lowest wealth that individuals may end up with in single-risk setting when they buy a pair 
of contracts 
L L LL
2 1 ,Θ Θ ≡ Θ .  Then, Proposition 3 basically says that an arbitrary utility 
function  u can be changed to u ~ for the lowest income levels such that, first, multi-risk 
equilibria for u and u ~  coincide, and, second, a single-risk equilibrium and a multi-risk 
equilibrium for u ~ also coincide.  Thus, without the LL types being present in the population,   14
equilibria under single-risk contracts may perform equally well as equilibria under multi-risk 
contracts. 
Proposition 3.  Let  0 =
LL α .  Then, for an arbitrary strictly concave and increasing utility 
function u there exists also strictly concave and increasing utility function u ~ so that: 




sep Ψ = Ψ ~ ; 
b)  () () () ( ) ( ) { } u u u u u
L H L H S
sep 2 2 1 1 , , , ~ Θ Θ Θ Θ = Ψ . 
Proof.  In accordance with Lemma 1, prices 
L
r P  and deductibles 
L
r D  are determined by the 
shape of the utility function  ( ) m u  over the range [m , 1], and are independent of the shape of 
() m u  for  () m m , 0 ∈ .  Hence, any legitimate utility function u ~, which coincides with u over 




sep Ψ = Ψ ~ .  
Consequently, we can drop utility function in the notion of multi-risk contracts  () u
r i
r Θ . 
Suppose now that the set { }
L H L H
2 2 1 1 , , , Θ Θ Θ Θ  of contracts is offered in single-risk setting.  
If an individual of type  {} LH HL LL i , , ∈  buys a pair of contracts 
L L LL
2 1 ,Θ Θ ≡ Θ , with 
probability  ()
i q 1 , 1  he will suffer from both accidents, and his wealth will be equal to  ( ) u m
LL .  
The ICC  LL i >  can be written as  0 ≥
i G , where 
() () ( ) () ( )
()() () () ()() () ()
()() () () () () () () () () . 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 , 1 2 2 1 , 0
1 1 0 , 1 0 , 0
2
1
u m u D P u q D P u D P u q
D P u D P u q P u P u q































LL i i i i
r r r
r r
− + − + − − − − − +
+ − − − − − + − − − =
Θ − Θ ≡
∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
Hence, outside the range  ( ) [] 1 , u m m∈ , only the value  ( ) ( ) u m u
LL  determines whether the ICC 
LL i >  is satisfied or not.  Hence, a sufficiently low value of  () ( ) u m u
LL ~  guarantees that 
() 0 > u G
i , and that no types buy a pair of contracts 
L L LL
2 1 ,Θ Θ ≡ Θ .  ■ 
Proposition 3 exploits the fact that the shape of the utility function at the lowest level of 
wealth, i.e.,  () u m
LL , does not affect multi-risk equilibrium contracts but does effect single-
risk incentive compatibility constraints.  It says that any utility function defined over the 
range  () [] 1 , u m m∈  can be extended over the range  ( ) ( ) u m m , 0 ∈  in such a way that the multi-
risk equilibrium set of contracts is also a single-risk equilibrium set.  A contraposition of 
Proposition 3 also holds: there are utility functions, which are defined over the range   15
() [] 1 , u m m∈ , for which any (increasing and concave) extension u ~ over the range 
() () u m m , 0 ∈  yields the result of Proposition 3, namely that single-risk and multi-risk 
insurance contracts perform equally well. 
Equilibrium with LL-type 
The main reason why in the absence of LL-type single-risk contracts may perform equally 
well as multi-risk contracts is that for a given utility function, none  of the ICC’s 
L L HH 2 1 ,Θ Θ > , 
L L HL 2 1 ,Θ Θ > , and 
L L LH 2 1 ,Θ Θ >  bind.  If, to the contrary, one of these 
ICC’s is violated, multi-risk contracts are strictly welfare superior to single-risk contracts.  In 
Proposition 4 below we show that in the presence of LL-types, multi-risk contracts are always 
(generically) welfare superior to single-risk contracts. 
Proposition 4.  Let  0 >
LL α .  For any generic utility function u the multi-risk competitive 
Nash equilibrium contracts are strictly Pareto-superior to the single-risk competitive Nash 
equilibrium contracts, i.e., 
S i M i W W
, , ≥  for all  { } LL HH LH HL i , , , ∈  and at least one of the 
inequalities is strict. 
Proof.  Suppose that contracts  ( )
H H M HH
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ ,  ( )
H L M LH
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ  and  ( )
L H M HL
2 1
, ,Θ Θ = Θ  
are offered.  Let us consider the contract  ( )
L L LL
2 1,Θ Θ = Θ  and the associated with it ICC’s 
LL HH > ,  LL HL> , and  LL LH > .  Generically, neither of these constraints hold as 
equality; some of them will not be binding, i.e.,  0 >
i G , and all the others will be violated, 
i.e.,  0 <
i G  (see proof of Proposition 3).  We consider these two mutually exclusive cases. 
a)  Let  0 >
i G  for  {} HH LH HL i , , ∈ .  This implies that there exist a contract 
* Θ  which (i) 
violates none of constraints  LL i >  for  { } HH LH HL i , , ∈ , and (ii) is such that 
() ( )
LL LL LL U U Θ > Θ
* .  In this case, insurance companies in multi-risk environment are 
able to offer the superior contract 
* Θ  to type LL so that all ICC’s are satisfied.  In single-
risk environment, to the contrary, any improvement of the contract  ( )
L L LL
2 1,Θ Θ = Θ  
requires an improvement of at least one of its single-risk components, which is not 
possible because  LH HH >  and  HL HH >  already bind.  Choosing 
() Θ ∈ Θ
LL U max arg
*  subject to all relevant ICC’s yields an equilibrium contract 
M LL, Θ    16
which strictly Pareto-dominates  ( )
L L LL
2 1,Θ Θ = Θ .  As  ( )
LL LL S LL U W Θ ≤
, , it follows that 
S LL M LL W W
, , > . 
b)  Let  0 <
j G  for some  { } HH LH HL j , , ∈ .  If this is the case, insurance companies in 
single-risk environment cannot provide contracts 
L
1 Θ  and 
L
2 Θ  because they are not 
incentive compatible.  Consequently, just like in the case  0 =
LL α , one of the inequalities 
S LH M LH W W
, , ≥  and 
S HL M HL W W
, , ≥  must be strict.  The only Pareto-condition that needs 
to be shown is that 
S LL M LL W W
, , ≥ .  This condition follows from the former two 
inequalities because the constraint  LL i
M
>  in the multi-risk setting, which is 
( )
M LL i M i U W
, , Θ ≥ , is less restrictive than the constraints  LL i
S
>  in the single-risk setting, 
which is  ( )
S LL i S i U W
, , Θ ≥ , for all  { } HH LH HL i , , ∈ .  Consequently, it must be that 
( ) ( )
S LL LL M LL LL U U
, , Θ ≥ Θ .  ■ 
In accordance with Proposition 4, at least one of the types  { } HH LH HL i , , ∈  is strictly better 
off under multi-risk contracts than under single-risk contracts.  Which type gets a superior 
contract depends on the specific utility function and other model parameters. 
4.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analyzed the welfare consequences of bundling different risks in one 
insurance contract.  The model we have developed to analyze this question is an extension of 
the competitive insurance model of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) to two sources of risk.  
Accordingly, there are four possible types and many incentive compatibility constraints to be 
considered.  The main effect of bundling in insurance contracts is on these incentive 
compatibility constraints.  We have shown that these effects are such that if all four possible 
types are present in the population, bundling always yields welfare improvements.  Due to the 
competition between insurance companies, these benefits accrue to consumers who 
potentially have fewer contracts to choose from, but benefit from the better sorting 
possibilities due to bundling. 
Our results can be easily generalized to the case of more than two types for each risk.  
Because multi-risk contracts are always strictly welfare-superior to single-risk contracts in 
case of four types, it is clear that the incentive compatibility constraints in case of more than   17
four generic types are weaker for multi-risk contracts than for single-risk contracts.   
Consequently, bundling always yields welfare improvements.  Another possible 
generalization is to assume more than two sources of risk.  Under this assumption, our results 
continue to hold because of the following reasoning.  Suppose that there are three sources of 
risk, and two types with respect to each risk.  We have shown that bundling risks 2 and 3 is 
always strictly welfare improving.  With respect to the combined outcome of these two risks, 
individuals come into four types, and the model can now be reformulated as if there were two 
risks: risk 1 with two types, and another risk (combination of risks 2 and 3) with four types.  
In the light of the previous generalization for more than two types, bundling all three risks is 
strictly welfare improving as well.  Lastly, the results remain intact even when different risks 
are correlated.  The exact prices and deductibles in equilibrium will certainly be affected by 
the correlation.  Nevertheless, all our propositions will continue to hold. 
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Appendix 
Lemma 1.  A contract 
HL Θ , which maximizes  ( )
HL HL U Θ  subject to ICC  HL HH >  and the 
zero-profit constraint  ( ) ∑ − =
s s s
HL
s D e q P , is a corner solution such that both constraints 
bind, and that  () ()
HL HL D D 1 , 1 1 , 0 = ,  () 0 0 , 1 =
HL D , and  () ( )
HL L H HL D e q e q P 1 , 0 2 2 1 1 − + = . 
Proof of Lemma 1.  The Lagrangian function for the maximization problem is 





























s W D P u q P D e q D P u q L 1 1 μ λ , 
and the first-order conditions are 
() ( )















0 , 0 \ , 1 ' 0
1 ' 0
S s D P u q q q
D
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s q q μ ≠  for any s.  Taking into account the definition of 
i
s q  allows us to 
rewrite the above equations as follows: 
() () () ( )
() () ()








= − − = − −
− − −
−
= − − = −
H L
L






D P u D P u
q q q
q
D P u P u
2 2
2
1 , 1 1 , 0
0 , 0 2 2
2
0 , 1
1 ' 1 '
1 1
1






Hence,  () 0 0 , 1 =
HL D  and  () ()
HL HL D D 1 , 1 1 , 0 =  due to  0 '> u . 
In order to show that  0 ≠ μ  we assume, to the contrary, that  0 = μ .  This implies 
() () () 0 0 , 1 1 , 1 1 , 0 = = =
HL HL HL D D D  and, consequently,  HL HH >  violates.  Thus,  0 ≠ μ , which implies 
that  HL HH >  binds and, together with the zero-profit condition, it determines  ()
HL D 1 , 0  and 
HL P  as a corner solution in the following system of two equations: 
() ( ) () () ( )





− − = − − + − −
H HL H HL
H H HL HL H HL H
q D e q e P
q e q e u D P u q P u q
2 1 , 0 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 , 0 2 2 1 1 1 1
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Interchanging risks 1 and 2 yields similar expressions for the contract 
LH Θ .  ■ 
Lemma 2.  Contracts 
HL Θ  and 
LH Θ  derived in Lemma 1 satisfy ICC’s  LH HL> ,  HL LH > , 
HH HL> , and  HH LH >  as strict inequalities. 
Proof of Lemma 2.  Let define functions  ( )
L LH q G 1  and  ( )
L LH q F 1  of the exogenous parameter 
L q1  as follows: 
( ) ( ) ( )
HL LH LH LH L LH U U q G Θ − Θ ≡ 1 , and 
( ) ( ) ( )
HH LH LH LH L LH U U q F Θ − Θ ≡ 1 . 
By the definitions of ICC’s, we need to show that  ( ) 0 1 >
L LH q G  and  ( ) 0 1 >
L LH q F  for all 
( )
H L q q 1 1 , 0 ∈ . 
It is easy to see that  ( ) 0 1 =
H LH q G : 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0 1 = Θ − Θ =
HL HH HH HH H LH U U q G  
because, in accordance with Lemma 1, ICC  HL HH >  binds.  Contracts 
( )
HL HL HL HL D D P , , 0 , = Θ  and  ( )
LH LH LH LH D D P , 0 , , = Θ  are determined by 






− − = − − + − −
L HL H HL
H H HL HL H HL H
q D e q e P
q e q e u D P u q P u q
2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
, and 






− − = − − + − −
L LH H LH
H H LH LH H LH H
q D e q e P
q e q e u D P u q P u q
1 1 2 2
2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
. 
Considering these equations as implicit functions  ( )
L LH q P 1 ,  ( )
L LH q D 1 ,  ( )
L HL q P 1 , and  ( )
L HL q D 1 , 










dP ,  ( ) 0 1 =
H LH q D ,  ( )
H H HH H LH q e q e P q P 1 1 2 2 1 + = = , and 
() ( ) ( )
() ( ) () ( ) ()
()













− − − − − −
− − + − −
− =
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This allows us to write 
L LH dq dG 1 /  as follows: 
() ( )( ) () ( )( ) ()
() ( ) ()
() ( ) ()
() ( ) () ( ) ()
LH
LH H L LH LH L H
LH LH LH L H
LH LH LH




P u q q D P u q q
P u D P u q q
D P u P u






− − − − − −
− − − −
−
− − − − − − =
− − − − − − − − + − − =
1
1 1 1 1
1 1
2 2 1 1
1 1
1 ' 1 1 ' 1
1 ' 1 '
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
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As  () 1 , 0 e D
LH ∈  for all  ( )
H L q q 1 1 , 0 ∈ , it follows that  0 / 1 <
L LH dq dG , and, consequently, 
( ) 0 1 >
L LH q G  for all  ( )
H L q q 1 1 , 0 ∈ . 
Finally, as  ( ) ( )
HH HH HH LH U U Θ = Θ  and is independent of 
L dq1 , it follows that 
0 / / 1 1 < =
L LH L LH dq dG dq dF , and, consequently,  ( ) 0 1 >
L LH q F  for all  ( )
H L q q 1 1 , 0 ∈ .  ■ 